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The welfare impact of a merger involves the market power offense and the efficiency defense. Salant et al. 
(1983)  show  that  mergers  among  symmetric  ﬁrms  are  unproﬁtable  except  for  monopolization.  We 
characterize the limit to this merger paradox in a simple linear Cournot oligopoly with asymmetric costs. 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide sufficient conditions for a proﬁtable merger to increase welfare but 
leave open whether it exists. We characterize the degree of cost asymmetry making a merger both proﬁtable 
and socially desirable. Comparing rationalization and synergy within the efficiency defense, we show that 
for most industry structures, a rationalization merger is more likely to be welfare enhancing but a synergy 
merger is more likely to be proﬁtable. 
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1.1 Overview
Thousands of mergers and acquisitions occur every year, many of them
drawing the attention of the media and antitrust authorities. The contro-
versy around these concentration operations can be synthesized as follows:
a merger is guilty of the market power oense but may be absolved by the
eciency defense.
In their pioneering paper, Salant et al. (1983) assess the market power
eect of a merger and show, in a symmetric Cournot framework, that merg-
ers are unprotable except for monopolization.1 Because so many mergers
are still protable for their promoters (about half according to empirical
studies), there would be a paradox unless cost saving eciencies are sys-
tematically involved. This is commensurate with the ample evidence on
large and persitent productivity dierences among producers, even within
narrowly dened industries. With respect to the literature extending Salant
et al. (1983), our rst contribution is to characterize the limit to the merger
paradox in terms of marginal cost asymmetries (in the same linear Cournot
oligopoly model).
Adopting a normative stance, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) analyze the
welfare eects of an horizontal merger and provide sucient conditions for
a protable merger to increase welfare. A positive quandary they do not
address is whether there are actually any protable mergers that are also
welfare improving. As the merger paradox indicates, eciencies must be
involved; our second contribution is to characterize the degree of cost asym-
metry that clears a merger in terms of welfare, thus addressing the afore-
mentioned dilemma (in the linear Cournot oligopoly model).
Lastly, we contribute to the controversy surrounding the eciency de-
fense. Schumpeter (1942)'s famous notion of \creative destruction" is akin
to rationalization whereby low-cost producers (or plants) gain market shares
at the expense of high-cost ones, in a process of entry, exit, acquisition and
mergers. In his defense of the eciency motive for mergers, Williamson
(1968) points at synergy whereby the newly merged rm successfully com-
bines the previously independent assets and improve her technology.2 This
seminal paper has given the synergy theoretical concept an edge in the aca-
1In the linear Cournot oligopoly model, they show that a protable merger must gather
at least 80% of the per-merger market shares.
2An example would be merging across borders to reduce uncertainty regarding output
markets, input supply, political pressure or currency risks.
2demic literature on eciency although rationalization prominently gures
in the US merger guidelines and is prevalent in the empirical literature on
mergers and productivity growth. Our model is simple enough to encompass
both types of eciencies and enable a fruitful comparison of their inuence
over the private protability and the social desirability of a merger.
In the remnant of this introduction, we recall the methodological debate
behind the eciency defense of mergers. Then, we state our contribution
and relate it to the literature. Lastly we detail our case for focusing on
rationalization. The next section presents our analytical results while the
third concludes.
1.2 Eciency Controversy
Two doctrines of economic competition vie for intellectual leardership. The
\Structure Conduct Performance" (SCP) paradigm, inspired by Bain (1951),
focuses on allocative or static eciency. It studies how rms compete simul-
taneously in current markets; its policy aim is to create workable competition
for the present. The Chicago critic builds on Schumpeter (1942)'s concept
of \creative destruction" and holds a dynamic view of eciency; it studies
how rms compete sequentially for the market and emphasizes innovation.
A temporary monopoly that enables an innovator to recoup its investment
is thus seen as a necessary evil on the path towards the higher goal of long
term progress.
This controversy spills over the handling of concentration operations
(mergers and acquisitions). The SCP paradigm holds a \market power"
view along the following causal relationship: mergers increase rms' market
power which leads to higher prices and hurts consumers. Since technologies
and tastes are exogenously given, total welfare must also decrease. On that
ground, signicant mergers ought to be opposed.
The Chicago critic approaches mergers from two angles. The \eciency
defense" started by Williamson (1968) broadens the SCP's vision in asserting
that mergers can contribute positively to welfare by bringing in eciencies.
It is also argued that the adequate criteria for antitrust authorities is (to-
tal) welfare rather than consumer surplus. More radically, Demsetz (1973)
contends that the SCP confuses correlation and causation.3 True, there is a
positive correlation between market concentration and industry protabil-
ity but which one drives the other cannot be identied with a comparative
statics exercise, the very tool used by the SCP paradigm. The Chicago
3cf. also Dewey (1961), McGee (1971) and Peltzman (1977).
3schools then endorses a reverse causal chain: the more ecient (innovative)
rms capture greater market shares, earn more and tend to buy out the
less ecient rms (or drive them out of the market). The policy implication
with respect to mergers is also reversed: allowing innovative rms to acquire
obsolete ones promotes eciency and ultimately welfare.
The academic debate spills over the real world as it inuences the an-
titrust perception of mergers. Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) recall that un-
til the 1970s, antitrust practitioners were in agreement with the \market
power" view and sought to protect consumers from monopolization. The
\eciency defense" of mergers has then overcome initial deance and be-
come increasingly accepted by antitrust authorities and courts (cf. x4 in
DoJ (1997) and xVII in EC (2004)). In a world where globalization has
triggered mergers waves of dimensions unseen before, it is of the essence
to understand the interplay between the two opposing views of eciencies
when assessing a merger.
1.3 Contribution
Our contribution is foremost a positive complement to the normative study
of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) (henceforth FS). Using the standard staple of
industrial organization, the linear Cournot model of oligopoly (e.g., Salant
et al. (1983)), we show how the eciency defense interacts with the market
power oense.4 In our static setting without entry nor exit, rms are either
advanced (cutting-edge) or obsolete. The percentage welfare loss due to a
switch from the ecient to the inecient technology in the entire industry is
called the technological gap; it is our measure of the technological asymmetry
among members of the industry. We focus on bilateral mergers since other
combinations are seldom observed.5
We start with the study of a rationalization merger whereby a cutting-
edge rm buys out an obsolete one. Proposition 1 shows that a mild techno-
logical gap is sucient for a rationalization merger to be welfare improving.
This means that the loss of consumer surplus resulting from the global out-
put contraction can be compensated by the prot increase of ecient rms
(the merging one and the outsiders to the deal). The condition can also be
4 As we emphasize in the conclusion, our ndings should not be taken at face value
when assessing actual merger cases given the highly stylized nature of our framework.
5This is probably due to the contracting costs of negotiation among shareholders. As
far as theory is concerned, a merger among many rms can still be decomposed into
successive bilateral mergers upon which our analysis can be applied (cf. Pesendorfer
(2005) for stylized facts).
4checked from market observables: the output of the absorbed obsolete rm
must be less than the total excess output of ecient rms.6
Proposition 2 characterizes the minimum technological gap making a ra-
tionalization merger (privately) protable; it turns out to be larger than the
previous one. The reason is the one at the root of the merger paradox: the
merged rm produces less than the combined output of merger participants;
a strong rationalization is thus needed to compensate for the relative prot
loss. Proposition 3 then restates a previously known outcome: a privately
protable merger involving at most half the industry is socially desirable. In
our linear setting, the condition boils down to an industry count of at least 5
rms or exactly 4 with at least 2 ecient. Our main result regarding ratio-
nalization mergers (Corollary 1) is then the combination of these preliminary
steps assuming the industry counts 5 or more rms. If the technological gap
is
 small: no one wants to merge; this is socially desirable.
 medium: no one wants to merge but a rationalization merger would
increase welfare.
 large: an ecient rm agrees to buy an obsolete one which is welfare
increasing.
 huge: obsolete rms are expelled from the market by ecient ones.
Given the competing roles of synergy and rationalization as alterna-
tives forms of eciency, it is worthwhile to compare them in our limited
framework. Proposition 4 characterizes the technological gap above which a
synergy merger is protable and raise welfare. We then show in Corollary 2
that for most industry structures, a rationalization merger is more likely to
be welfare enhancing but a synergy merger is more likely to be protable.
Lastly, we take a look at within-rm innovation as the ability to up-
grade technology from obsolete to cutting-edge. We obtain very intuitive
results: rstly, it is privately and socially desirable for an obsolete rm to
become cutting-edge, secondly two obsolete rms won't merge if they cannot
innovate.
1.4 Literature
Cournot (1838) introduces the model of quantity competition and observes
that a rm with low marginal cost produces more than higher-cost rms,
6Individual excess output is the dierence in production between an ecient and ob-
solete rm.
5and that some of them might be forced to exit.7 He also notices that a
given total industry output would be produced at higher cost by competing
asymmetric producers than if a monopolist made their production decisions
(because their marginal costs are not equal at equilibrium).
Williamson (1968) exploits this intuition and shows that if a merger
generates a synergy (i.e., marginal cost reduction) then the welfare loss due
to the price increase may be compensated by the cost saving. Although the
original model is crude, the intuition is so strong that it remains robust to
generalizations.
Cowling and Waterson (1976) show in a Cournotian model that the
average prot-revenue ratio is equal to the concentration-elasticity ratio.
Although no causality can be deduced from this formula, it has been adopted
as a foundation for the \market power" rationale. Clarke and Davies (1982)
further show that the Herndhal concentration index increases with the
variance of rms' marginal costs; this proves that concentration is greater
when some rms have a cost advantage, a result that lands support to the
dynamic eciency rationale. In the same vein, Salant and Shaer (1999)
show that if the average marginal costs in the industry is constant, then so
is aggregate output and consumer surplus. When a shock makes such an
industry more cost-asymmetric, concentration, aggregate prot and welfare
all increase together.8 This nding provides a rationale for government
support of "national champions" at the expense of other domestic rms
with the same initial technology.
Salant et al. (1983) address the protability of mergers in the Cournot
oligopoly with symmetric marginal cost and show that except for monopo-
lization, mergers are unprotable. This paradox points at synergies or scale
economies as the real motive for mergers. FS further develop the Cournot
model by considering asymmetric technologies. They characterize market
structures where a concentration operation raises welfare and price simul-
taneously. Yet, they do not to put cost asymmetries and rationalization at
the forefront since they moslty deal with synergies. As already explained,
our work aims at lling this gap.
To show that concentration can be socially benecial, Daughety (1990)
studies symmetrical rms that behave asymmetrically  a la Stackelberg: part
of the industry commits to its output at some point whereas the rest does
7The properties enunciated in this paragraph are proved in the appendix.
8The intuition lies in the fact that individual prot is convex increasing in output, thus
convex decreasing in marginal cost. This means that every rm is a risk-lover when it
comes to draw a technology from a distribution with xed mean (cf. F evrier and Linnemer
(2004) for a generalization).
6so later on (apart of which all are Cournot players).9 Huck et al. (2004)
rene the argument with the idea of \commitment by governance" whereby
the new rm's owner forces the managers of the formerly independent units
to behave as leader and follower.
In the EU, the \safe harbor" condition bestows immunity from antitrust
scrutiny if combined market shares are below 50% (cf. Parisi (2007) xIII.D).
Levin (1990) rationalizes it by considering a Cournot oligopoly among sym-
metric rms yet allowing the merged rm to behave dierently afterwards.10
Heubeck et al. (2006) improve on this feature by sticking to Cournot behav-
ior and introducing a unique cutting-edge rm; their model is thus a partic-
ular case of ours. They compute the minimum number of merger candidates
making a merger protable and then the maximum number of merger can-
didates consistent with a welfare increase. The authors only prove that the
two conditions are compatible with the help of a graphical plot. A short-
coming of their approach is to focus on \many rms" mergers which is a
scarcely observed phenomenon. They however point out that cost ecien-
cies as well as the entire cost structure of the industry matter when assessing
the welfare eect of a merger, a claim we are able to conrm.
Within the trade literature, a number of papers use a framework close to
ours when studying international mergers but their focus is on the impact
of tari reductions (e.g. Benchekroun and Chaudhuri (2006)). An excep-
tion is Neary (2007) who considers rationalization mergers and derives our
proposition 2. Similarities and dierences with our work are highlighted in
the text.
The literature cited up to this point emphasizes the normative aspect
of mergers. There also exists a positive literature dealing with entry and
merger waves, topics which fall out of the scope of our simple static one{
shot game. Kamien and Zang (1990) show that monopolization is not to be
expected because early acquirees require a too high price from the acquirer
in anticipation that the nal conglomerate will be highly protable. More
recently, Pesendorfer (2005) considers the case where a merger may lead to
additional mergers in the future; his results tend to oppose those of static
models. The impact of potential entry on merger protability is taken on
by Werden and Froeb (1998), Spector (2003), and Davidson and Mukherjee
9The author motivates this unorthodox choice by stating rather bluntly \ I take as
given that rms may nd (this) asymmetry advantageous".
10The author does not explain how this change of behavior comes about. It is also
noticeable that all his results are out{of{equilibrium comparative static exercises, that is
to say, the preconditions may well never take place so that the conclusions may well never
matter.
7(2007). Endogenous mergers are studied by Qiu and Zhou (2007) for ratio-
nalization and by Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) and Banal Esta~ nol et al.
(2008) for synergies.
1.5 Rationalization
The eciency improvement at the core of Schumpeter (1942)'s concept of
\creative destruction" is rationalization. The latest US merger guidelines,
which is the outcome of decades of practice, acknowledges this vision when
it signals rationalization as the most substantial eciency (cf. production
reshuing in x4, DoJ (1997)).11 In his chapter for the Handbook of In-
dustrial Organization, Whinston (2007) conrms the practical importance
of rationalization (p 2385) when stating: at an empirical level, oligopolistic
industries (i.e., those in which mergers are likely to be scrutinized) often
exhibit substantial variation in marginal cost across rms... A potentially
signicant source of welfare variation arising from a horizontal merger is ...
the welfare changes arising from shifts of production across rms that have
diering marginal costs; so-called,\production reshuing".
Synergies and scale economies also suers from a weak theoretical under-
pinning as recognized by Farrell and Shapiro (2001) when stating (p 5) that
claimed synergies are double-edged: the same conditions that tend to make
synergies more merger-specic and more benecial to consumers also tend
to make the merger itself more problematic. In that respect, scale economies
and buyer power are suspicious since they can often be achieved unilater-
ally. True synergies, in turn, are based on complementarities which makes
the merger non horizontal and rather similar to vertical integration. Lastly,
these eciencies bear no relation to the mode or intensity of market com-
petition. This means that any welfare loss due to \market power" can be
compensated by a large enough add-hoc synergy or scale economy.12
The empirical literature also support rationalization vs. synergies when
analyzing mergers and the general pace of industry change. In their inter-
national study, Gugler et al. (2003) nd that mergers increase prots and
lose market shares. Empirically, 29% of mergers are protable and welfare-
enhancing, 28% are unprotable and inecient, 27% are protable and inef-
11Although a merger strengthening a dominant position is to be barred, authorities
make an exception when the target is in hardship; this is the failing rm defense in the
US and the rescue merger in the EU. This lenient policy is a recognition of the positive
welfare eect of rationalization.
12This is actually what managers claim to gain regulatory and shareholder approval. In
many cases such as Daimler{Chrysler, the acquirer ends-up reselling the target because
the synergies fail to materialize.
8cient, the remaining 15% being unprotable but eciency-enhancing (irra-
tional mergers undertaken by hubristic CEOs). Pesendorfer (2003), studying
the paper industry, observes also that merged rms are more likely to scrap
capacity subsequent to an acquisition, in accordance with rationalization.
Also, a majority of acquiring rms achieve an eciency increase following
an acquisition, in accordance with synergy. Gugler and Siebert (2007) pro-
vide similar evidence from the semiconductor industry.
As summarized by Foster et al. (2008), a robust nding of studies based
on business-level microdata is that within-industry reallocation and its as-
sociated rm turnover contributes substantially to industry productivity
growth. The main driver of aggregate productivity changes is the reallo-
cation of market shares to more ecient producers, either through market
share shifts among incumbents, M&A or through entry and exit.13
2 A Model of Horizontal Merger
2.1 Specications
A market for an homogeneous product has linear demand D(p) = M  
p.14 Since the empirical literature reports large and lasting productivity
dierences among plants (within an industry), we consider advanced (a)
versus bygone (b) technologies or in eciency terms, cutting-edge versus
obsolete. For i = a;b, there are ni active rms with the same constant
marginal cost ci and zero xed cost. We let n  na + nb denote the total
number of rms and c 
cana+cbnb
na+nb the average (egalitarian) marginal cost
of the industry.
The marginal cost gap   cb   ca > 0 can be seen as a consequence of
past choices regarding R&D or internal organization (Salant et al. (1983) use
 = 0). We let Q
a  M  ca and Q
b  Q
a   be the ecient (competitive)
market outputs under the uniform use of each of the two technologies. We








M cb which is approximatively the welfare loss due to the use of the obsolete
technology (over the ecient one).15 Indeed, the maximum welfare with the
13cf. also Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Melitz (2003).
14In such a simple setting, there is no loss of generality in using a unitary slope since
all cost terms can be rescaled to achieve it.
15Qiu and Zhou (2007) use the market size M as their main parameter for static com-
parative purposes.
9ecient and obsolete technologies is W
i = (Q

















Let us rst characterize the equilibrium in the Cournot game of quantity
competition. The FOCs of prot maximization are
2qa = M   ca   (na   1)qa   nbqb
2qb = M   cb   (nb   1)qb   naqa
(1)
so that the equilibrium individual quantities are
qa =
M   ca + nb
n + 1
and qb =
M   cb   na
n + 1
(2)
where we notice the production wedge qa qb = : Obsolete rms participate
only if




a condition which we shall assume to hold.16
Total equilibrium quantity is Q  naqa + nbqb = n
n+1(M   c) while the
equilibrium price is p = M+cn
n+1 . As usual with Cournot competition, it can
be checked that the individual prot is i = q2
i for i = a;b. This means
that rms are looking forward to expand their sales. We dene the prot
aggregates i  nii for i = a;b. Since consumer surplus is S(Q) = 1
2Q2,
total welfare is W = S + a + b.
2.2 Price eect of a merger
Upon merging an ecient rm to an obsolete one, we have n0
a = na and
n0
b = nb  1 since the new owner will use exclusively the ecient technology
i.e., shuts down the obsolete plant. The output changes between the old
and new equilibrium computed using (2) are qb = qa =
qb
n > 0 i.e., the
increased concentration benets all remaining rms. Yet one obsolete rm
has been shut down so that the aggregate change is Q = (n   1)
qb
n   qb =
 
qb
n < 0. We have thus shown,
Lemma 1 Acquisition of an obsolete rm by an ecient one raises the
market price.
16In the presence of many rms, if obsolete ones start to acquire the ecient technology
(nb &;na %), there is a threshold at which (3) ceases to hold i.e., all the remaining
obsolete rms are forced to exit. At this point, concentration would increase sharply.
10Lemma 1 is a particular case of FS's Proposition 2 (p. 112) stating that
\If a merger generates no synergies, then it causes price to rise". The proof
here shows that no matter how strong the technological asymmetry, the indi-
rect improvement of the industry cost structure falls short of compensating
the direct eect of losing one producer. In the symmetric technologies case,
there is no indirect eect so that concentration reduces output and thus wel-
fare (recall that market output is then an exhaustive indicator of welfare).
2.3 Welfare eect of a merger













a = na(2qa + qa)qa = na(2qa + qa)
qb
n (5)
b = (nb   1)(qb + qb)2   nbq2
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Let us interpret (7) using the rightmost expression. The rst term is the
positive welfare balance brought about by ecient rms whereas the nega-
tive second term is slightly more than the output of the obsolete mothballed
rm. In equilibrium, an ecient rm produces more than an obsolete one;
let us call \output gap" the dierence qa qb = . We have thus an intuitive
condition for a merger between two asymmetric rms to be welfare improv-
ing: the combined output gap of all ecient rms na is slightly larger than
the output of the retired obsolete rm. Fulllment requires either that e-
cient rms are numerous enough or that their cost advantage is large enough
to overcome the output loss of the retired obsolete rm. Using (2), we can
rearrange (7) in terms of the fundamentals of the model:
W > 0 , na (M   ca + nb) > (M   cb   na)
 
na + 1 + 1
2n

, na (M   cb + (nb + 1)) > (M   cb   na)
 
na + 1 + 1
2n


















1 + 4n + 2n2 (8)
We have thus shown,
11Proposition 1 Acquisition of an obsolete rm by an ecient one raises
welfare if and only if the technological gap is larger than the threshold a;b.
Compatibility with the condition for participation of obsolete rms is
achieved since a;b < 2
na (cf. eq. (3)). Table 1 in the Appendix displays
the rather low percentage values of the threshold a;b for combinations of
obsolete (b) and cutting-edge (a) rms.
2.4 Protability of a merger
Stigler (1950) famously said that \the promoter of a merger is likely to re-
ceive much encouragement from each rm, ..., except participation"; this
is because in the present framework, there is more to gain by remaining
an outsider to a merger rather than being an insider.17 To avoid compli-
cations, we disregard such an anticipation and study the protability of a
merger among myopic rms i.e., we focus on exogenous mergers instead of
endogenous ones.
For a merger between two asymmetric rms, the prot change from the
pre to the post merger situation is

  0




















2nqa   (n2   1)qb
 (9)
Using (2), we can rearrange (9) as

 > 0 , 2n(M   cb    + nb) > (n2   1)(M   cb   na)
, (M   cb)
 
n2   2n   1





=  > a;b  2
n2   1   2n
2n(nb + 1) + (n2   1)na
(10)
We have thus shown,
Proposition 2 Acquisition of an obsolete rm by an ecient one is pri-
vately protable if and only if the technological gap is larger than the thresh-
old a;b.
This proposition is independently derived by Neary (2007) who inter-
prets it as the technology gap between two countries (e.g., advanced vs.
developing) that triggers cross border mergers. Table 2 in the Appendix
illustrates the technological gap required for (10) to hold. We also notice in
the last row the compatibility of (10) with the condition (3) for participation
of obsolete rms.
17This observation is at the root of Salant et al. (1983)'s well known merger paradox.
122.5 Private vs. Social suitability of a merger
To nd out under what circumstances a price raising merger (between rms
#1 and #2) nevertheless increases welfare, FS uses the \external eect"
approach: they presume a privately benecial merger and then proceed to









In the general Cournot model with constant returns to scale for the non-
merging rms, it can be shown that
q1+q2
Q  1
2 is a sucient condition for
(11). For a linear demand, this condition is also necessary. Thus, quoting
FS,
Lemma 2 A privately protable merger involving at most half the industry
is socially desirable.
For policy purposes, the \external eect" approach is attractive as it
enables to elude the computation of the merger eciency which is a private
information hardly accessible to antitrust authorities. However, this method
has a serious drawback in that the presupposition might be empty in which
case Lemma 2 is a void statement. FS recognize this risk when applying
(11) to Salant et al. (1983)'s linear symmetric Cournot model where it is well
known that a protable merger must involve at least 3=4 of the industry.18 In
our model, it is possible to solve the issue analytically. A privately protable
merger is welfare improving if a;b  a;b
, 0  na
 






















a   na   1

(12)
whose solution is na + nb  5 or (na + nb = 4 and na > 1).19 Notice then
that the solution to (12) agrees with (11) i.e., in all acceptable combina-
tions (na;nb), the pre-merger combined market share of an ecient and an
obsolete rm is less than 50%. We have thus shown,
18One must take care of not interpreting Lemma 2 as: a merger involving at most half
the industry is socially desirable but won't materialize because it is not protable for its
promoters.






na which satises f(1) '
3:4, f(2) ' 1:4, f(3) ' 0:1 and f(na) < 0 for na > 3: Since ni  1 for i = a;b, the result
follows.
13Proposition 3 The privately protable acquisition of an obsolete rm by
an ecient one is welfare enhancing if and only if the industry counts at
least 5 rms or exactly 4 of which at least 2 are ecient.
Proposition 3 is a corollary of Lemma 2 recalling us that in the linear
Cournot setting, rms tend to be of equal size, even in the presence of cost
asymmetries. Hence, only four market structure combinations of obsolete
and ecient rms are eliminated (cf. underlined entries in Table 2). In
other words, almost any privately protable merger is socially desirable if the
industry has at least ve participants. Bringing together our propositions,
we obtain:
Corollary 1 In an industry whose structure satises (12), if the technology
gap is
   a;b: a merger is unprotable and a source of dead weigth loss.
 a;b <   a;b: a merger is welfare enhancing but still unprotable.
 a;b <   2
na: a merger is welfare enhancing and protable.
  > 2
na: obsolete rms are expelled from the market by ecient ones.
The contraposition of Corollary 1 is that some protable mergers are
welfare regressive contrary to Neary (2007)'s claim p1244 that \since only
high-cost rms are eliminated, the increase in production eciency ensures
that the rise in prots dominates the fall in consumer surplus."20 This will
be the case for the underlined entries of Table 2 when  > a;b.
2.6 Synergy
Given the competing roles of synergy and rationalization as alternatives
forms of eciency, it is worthwhile comparing them in our framework. Al-
though the US merger guidelines singles out rationalization as the prime
source of eciency, it also contemplates synergies when considering the pos-
sibility for two obsolete rms to merge and thereby succeed to upgrade their
technology,21 which we refer to as a catching-up merger.
20Neary (2007) only states the claim and refers the reader to Lahiri and Ono (1988) but
in this latter article, the exact computation is absent.
21cf. DoJ (1997): \For example, merger-generated eciencies may enhance competition
by permitting two ineective (e.g., high cost) competitors to become one eective (e.g.,
lower cost) competitor." The newly merged rm could even leapfrog the current best
technology.
14In this situation, we have n0
a = na + 1 and n0
b = nb   2. Using the
individual output formulas (2), we nd qa = qb =  Q =
qb 
n  z.












a = (na + 1)(2qa + qa)qa + q2
a = na(2qa + z)z + q2
a
b = (nb   2)(2qb + qb)qb   2q2
b = (nb   2)(2qb + z)z   2q2
b
thus W = z
 1








b = (qa + 2qb)(qa   2qb) =  (3qb + )(qb   ) =  (3qb + )nz
  1





so that expanding z we obtain
W







  (3qb + )n
= na + nqb   (3qb + )   3
2
qb 
n   (3qb + )n
= 
  3




2n + 3 + 3
2n

< 0 since 3
2n < 1 + nb
We now look at private protability. To the extend that the emulation
of the advanced technology is costless or free of charge, the protability of





a   2qb = qa + qa   2qb = z   (qb   ) =  (n   1)z
thus has the same sign as W. To conclude W > 0 and  > 0 if and only
if
z < 0 , qb <  ,  > a;b 
2
2na + nb + 1
(13)
using again formula (2). We have thus shown,
Proposition 4 A catching-up synergy merger is protable and raises wel-
fare if and only if the technological gap is larger than the threshold a;b.
We can now compare synergy and rationalization mergers in their rela-
tion to existing cost asymmetries in the industry. Regarding protability, it
is a matter of algebra to show that a;b a;b is proportional to n(n 4) 1;
it is thus positive if and only if n  5. Regarding welfare, we can show
that a;b   a;b is proportional to 2n(na   1)   1; it is thus positive if and
only if na > 1. To cluster these ndings assume n  5 and na > 1 so that
a;b < a;b < a;b is true. For a small technology gap (a;b <  < a;b), both
15types of mergers are unprotable but the rationalization merger is welfare
enhancing. For an intermediate technology gap (a;b <  < a;b), both types
of mergers are welfare enhancing but only the synergy merger is protable.
In other words, welfare increases faster with the technology gap under ra-
tionalization whereas protability increases faster with the technology gap
under synergy. Summarizing, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2 In an industry counting at least ve rms of which more than
one is advanced, a rationalization merger is more likely to be welfare en-
hancing but a synergy merger is more likely to be protable.
Another way to explain why a synergy merger can be protable is to
reason that it is analytically equivalent to the following two-step procedure:
an obsolete rm innovates which is both welfare improving and protable
(cf. Proposition 5). Then, the newly ecient rm acquires an obsolete one;
this is welfare improving and protable under the conditions of propositions
1{3. Since the rst step involves both a private and social gain, the welfare
or prot hurdle for the second step ought to be easier to pass. However,
the market structure is dierent at the start of the two steps so that no
immediate conclusion is available.
2.7 Innovation
In our simple setting, rationalization is either production reshuing with
closure of the obsolete plant or knowledge diusion with the upgrading of
the obsolete plant towards the cutting-edge technology. The second inter-
pretation being linked to innovation, it makes sense to contrast our previous
ndings with internal technical progress i.e., self-innovation.
When an obsolete rm succeeds to lower its marginal cost, the market
structure becomes n0
a = na + 1 and n0
b = nb   1. We observe from formula
(2) that qa = qb =  
n+1 < 0 i.e., all rms but the innovative one produce
less, yet Q = 
n+1 > 0 because the innovator increases its supply by
qa   qb = . Hence, the innovation favors consumer surplus. One cannot,
however, conclude immediately that welfare increases since the technology
upgrade intensies market rivalry which hurts all the other rms. We thus
need to compute exactly the welfare change. Using again (2) and denoting
z = M   cb; we have qa =
z+(nb+1)
















2 a = (na + 1)(z + nb)
2   na (z + (nb + 1))
2
(n + 1)
2 b = (nb   1)(z   (na + 1))
2   nb (z   na)
2
Letting 	  2na (na + 2)   2nb (nb + 1) + 1, we obtain
W / 2z(n + 2)   	 = (M   cb)





as  = 2
M cb
Hence the innovation is welfare improving if and only if 4(n+2) > 	 which
is true whenever 	 < 0 i.e., there are not so many ecient rms. To show
that this still holds true when 	 > 0 (i.e., when na is large), we use the fact
that  < 2
na (cf. (3)). We then only need to prove the sucient condition
4(n+2) > 2
na	 which, as one can check from the denition of 	, is trivially
satised. It is only when several obsolete rms are forced to exit (violation
of (3)) that welfare might drop because concentration jumps abruptly. We
thus obtain:22
Proposition 5 Innovation by an obsolete rm towards the ecient tech-
nology is socially desirable and lowers the price.
The last possibility we consider is when two obsolete rms merge without
any technological improvement. We have n0
a = na and n0
b = nb  1 since the
new owner will use either of the two obsolete technologies (but not both).
From a market outcome point of view, the disappearance of an obsolete rm
is as if an advanced rm had bought it; hence the results of lemma 1 and
proposition 1 regarding price and welfare remain valid. To see that such a
merger is unprotable, we study
  0










and notice that  < 0 , n > 2. If there are only obsolete rms (na = 0), we
fall back on the Salant et al. (1983) paradox when only a duopoly merging
to monopoly is protable. Otherwise, there is at least one ecient rm and
at least the two merging obsolete ones, so that the condition holds. Our
framework thus yields a more clear cut result than proposition 3 of Heubeck
et al. (2006).
Proposition 6 A non innovative merger between two obsolete rms is un-
protable.
22A similar possibility is hinted at by Lahiri and Ono (1988).
173 Conclusion
That a merger can increase market power and the productive eciency of
the industry at the same time is well understood. However, the impact on
welfare of these opposing forces is hard to disentangle because they work
at dierent levels. The market power oense is direct and easy to grasp:
in the Cournot model of oligopolistic competition (as well as in most other
IO models), higher concentration leads to a higher equilibrium price and a
lower consumer surplus. The eciency defense suers from a more convo-
luted reasoning as it works indirectly: a merger bestows insiders with the
opportunity to improve their technology, thus reduce their cost and become
ercer competitors. This tends to lower the price and generate prot gains
that MAY overcome the aforementioned consumer surplus loss.
In this paper, we simplify the Farrell and Shapiro (1990) framework to
pinpoint the necessary degree of eciency improvement (rationalization) for
the previous assertion to be true. We also make a methodological point by
leveling the playing eld between the market power oense and the eciency
defense regarding the welfare eects of mergers. Our framework, like most of
the literature, employs the highly stylized Cournot model; needless to say,
its implications for antitrust policy should be handled with care. Several
limitations are worth mentioning.
Firstly, we take welfare to be the adequate social objective whereas con-
sumer surplus was historically the focus of antitrust authorities; in that
latter case, theoretical conclusions are clear-cut since a merger involving
large rms and without signicant synergies ought to be barred. Secondly,
an obvious shortcoming of assuming constant marginal cost is that upon
being acquired an obsolete rm is shut down and the only advantage for
the acquirer is to reduce market rivalry.23 In real mergers, it is rare to see
all the assets of the acquired rm being divested. Rather, inecient plants
are closed or re-organized with injections of human and physical capital.
Thirdly, the linear Cournot model, even with asymmetric cost, tends to give
similar market shares in equilibrium to all rms. The real impact of tech-
nological asymmetries is thus probably stronger but since it might increase
both the \market power" and the \dynamic eciency" eects of a merger,
it remain dicult to sign. Fourthly, our analysis disregards xed costs al-
together which play a crucial part in the assessment of synergies and scale
economies brought about by mergers. Fifth of all, we consider exogenous
23Because this property is a public good, outsiders to the merger free-ride on the insiders
to the merger without having to support the cost.
18mergers and not endogenous one i.e., we do not allow for reactions such as
entry or exit after mergers. Lastly, although we discourse at length about
dynamic eciency, our approach is static; it thus neglects the fact that con-
centration operations tend to facilitate collusion by reducing the number of
people involved.
Appendix
Properties of the Cournot equilibrium under asymmetric cost
Let D(:) be the market demand and P(:) its inverse, the willingness to
pay. There are n active rms with constant marginal cost ci for i  n.
We denote Q 
P
in qi the aggregate output,    P








the HHI concentration index, i = qi(p   ci) the
individual prot,  
P





The FOC of prot maximization is
















which is the Cowling and Waterson (1976) formula (notice that they use a
model of quantity competition  a la Cournot with conjectural variations).
















(p    c +  c   ci)





c is the variance of the sample of marginal costs. Observe now
that summing (14), we obtain n(p    c) =
p




















where vc is the coecient of variation. This is the Clarke and Davies (1982)
formula.
19Salant and Shaer (1999) observe that summing the left version of (14),
one gets P(Q)+ 1
nQP0(Q) =  c i.e., aggregate output Q and consumer surplus
S depend on  c only. Now, by combining (15) and (17), we get n
pQ = 1+(1 
n)2vc. When  c is constant, so are Q;p;, thus welfare W = +S increases
with dispersion of technologies. The limit is reached when a maximum
number of rms are driven out of the market (or at least lose their economic
rent) while the remaining ones achieve zero marginal cost, a result in the
line of Cournot's observation regarding industry cost.
Numerical Values for Thresholds
For nb obsolete (b) and na cutting-edge (a) rms, we have
nb
na 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 59 23 12 8 5 4 3 2
2 45 18 10 7 5 4 3 2
3 37 15 9 6 4 3 2 2
4 31 13 8 5 4 3 2 2
5 27 12 7 5 3 3 2 2
6 24 11 6 4 3 2 2 2
2
na 200 100 67 50 40 33 29 25
Table 1: Minimum technology gap (in %) for a welfare improving merger
nb
na 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 -18 14 23 24 23 22 20 18
2 15 26 27 26 24 22 20 19
3 30 32 30 27 25 22 20 19
4 38 35 32 28 25 23 21 19
5 43 38 33 29 26 23 21 19
6 47 39 34 29 26 23 21 19
2
na 200 100 67 50 40 33 29 25
Table 2: Minimum technology gap (in %) for a protable merger
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